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No Claim, No Pain: Measuring the Non-Take-up of 
Social Assistance Using Register Data
* 
 
The main objectives of social assistance benefits, including poverty alleviation and labor-
market or social reintegration, can be seriously compromised if support is difficult to access. 
While recent studies point to high non-take-up rates, existing evidence does not make full 
use of the information recorded by benefit agencies. Most studies have to rely on interview-
based data, with misreporting and measurement errors affecting the variables needed to 
establish both benefit receipt and benefit entitlement. In this paper, we exploit a unique 
combination of Finnish administrative data and eligibility simulations based on the tax-benefit 
calculator of the Finnish authorities, carefully investigating the measurement issues that 
remain. We find rates of non-take-up that are both substantial and robust: 40% to 50% of 
those eligible do not claim. Using repeated cross-section estimations for years 1996-2003, 
we identify a set of stable determinants of claiming behavior and suggest that changes in 
behavior could drive the observed downward trend in take-up rates during the post-recession 
period. We discuss the poverty implications of our results. 
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Most OECD countries operate social assistance (SA) schemes designed to secure a minimum level
of resources for low-income families. However, the redistributive e⁄ectiveness of such policies
can be compromised if intended recipients end up not claiming bene￿ts because of informational
problems, stigma e⁄ects or constraining administrative procedures. The recent literature actu-
ally points to a substantial non-take-up of income maintenance programs, especially in countries
with generous schemes like Germany, France or Nordic countries (see surveys of Hernanz et al.,
2004, Currie, 2004, and Matsaganis, 2007).
Yet, the available evidence is fragmented. Despite its policy relevance, the phenomenon of
non-take-up is not studied systematically or on a regular basis. Moreover, most existing studies
are unable to exploit the rich data on bene￿t claimants that bene￿t agencies record as part
of the claiming process. Instead, they most often have to rely on interview data. The result-
ing take-up measures are potentially biased by misreporting and measurement errors a⁄ecting
either bene￿t receipt or household characteristics (like income) used to assess theoretical eligi-
bility. Together, these issues reduce the reliability of the resulting take-up rates and of ￿ndings
that link take-up behavior to observable characteristics. Several studies have used econometric
techniques to control for measurement errors (see Duclos, 1995, McGarry, 1996, Pudney, 2001,
Terracol, 2002, among others). Using administrative data is an alternative, and perhaps a more
direct way of addressing some of these di¢ culties. Yet, this type of data is not easily available
and generally not well-suited for studying bene￿t take-up (while bene￿t registers contain, by de-
￿nition, the most important data for calculating bene￿t entitlements, they often do not contain
any information about those who do not claim bene￿ts).
The main contribution of this paper is to derive accurate measures of non-take-up based on
comprehensive administrative data. We study the claiming patterns in the Finnish SA scheme
(Toimeentulotuki), a relatively generous program that provides a ￿nancial safety net for those
with no or very limited incomes from other sources. We focus on the years 1996-2003, following
the deep recession of the early 1990s. Information on actual bene￿t receipt is obtained using
eight waves of an administrative data source, the Income Distribution Survey (IDS), while the-
oretical entitlements are simulated using TUJA, the tax-bene￿t calculator maintained and used
by the Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT) and the Finnish government. The
algorithms used in the tax-bene￿t model resemble as closely as possible the relevant entitlement
rules as applied by bene￿t agencies. Household characteristics used to simulate eligibility rules
are based on register information from IDS data and are largely identical to the information
used by bene￿t agencies to assess formal entitlement. We provide a careful sensitivity analysis
1in order to investigate remaining measurement issues, notably possible errors due to the fact
that, as in other countries, bene￿t authorities have some room for discretion over entitlement
levels.
Results can be summarized as follows. The resulting micro-economic evidence points to
signi￿cant degrees of non-take-up of SA among the Finnish working-age population of about
40-50%. Hence, our results are broadly in line with several studies which report high non-
take-up rates in countries with relatively generous SA schemes. We estimate the propensity
of non-take-up on a detailed set of socio-demographic characteristics and for each year, which
allows us to characterize stable determinants of claiming behavior over time, in particular ex-
pected unemployment duration, expected bene￿t amounts and variables associated to transac-
tion/information costs or stigma. Finally, we decompose the change in non-take-up rates over
time and ￿nd that the observed decline in SA receipt (and take-up) in the second half of the
1990s is likely driven by a change in take-up attitude during recovery years.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing literature on SA take-
up. Section 3 discusses the economic and policy context in Finland and provides an overview
of social assistance rules. Section 4 describes the data, provides baseline results and examines
the robustness of the resulting take-up measures. In Section 5, we estimate the correlates of
non-take-up behavior and present a decomposition analysis to explain the recent time trend.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Brief Look at the Literature
There is evidence of non-take-up for several countries and di⁄erent types of bene￿ts (SA, hous-
ing bene￿t, unemployment bene￿ts), as surveyed for instance in Hernanz et al. (2004).1 Table
1 reviews some studies speci￿cally on the non-take-up of poverty-alleviating transfers. Several
observations stand out. Firstly, non-take-up rates across countries and schemes vary consider-
ably ￿certain policy designs are more e⁄ective than others ￿but are always signi￿cant. Sec-
ondly, there are sizable di⁄erences across studies for the same program (e.g., AFDC in the US),
which indicates that data and measurement issues present a fundamental di¢ culty in this area.
Interview-based surveys tend to overstate non-take-up (see Hernanz et al., 2004, and Blank,
1997). This limitation applies to most studies reported in Table 1, with the exceptions of those
which account for measurement error using the econometric approach suggested in particular
by Duclos (1995) and McGarry (1996).
1According to Hernanz et al., estimates typically span a range of between 40% and 80% in the case of SA and
housing bene￿t programs, and between 60% and 80% for unemployment compensation.
2Interestingly, studies on countries known to maintain generous SA programs, like Germany
and the Nordic countries, all point to high non-take-up rates. This is the case even though
methods used are very di⁄erent. For Germany, Riphahn (2001) and other studies cited in table
1 use an approach very similar to ours, based on a comparison between theoretical eligibility
and actual receipt of SA. For Nordic countries, existing evidence relies on speci￿c surveys on
self-reported claiming behavior. Virjo (2000) uses a small mail survey of the 1995 Finnish
population while Gustafsson (2002) uses phone interviews for Swedish individuals in the years
1985 and 1997. Both studies ￿nd very high rates of non-take-up.2
The present study, based mostly on administrative data, con￿rms that non-take-up is high
in Finland ￿ even if not as high as reported by Virjo. Equally important, our econometric
estimations point to similar determinants of non-take-up as what is qualitatively described in
self-assessment surveys on Sweden and Finland. We come back to this in section 5.
3 Social Assistance in Finland
3.1 The Economic and Policy Context
In Finland, the deep recession of the early 1990s has caused the loss of nearly half a million jobs,
pushing the unemployment rate from less than 5% to more than 15% ￿see Figure 1. As incomes
declined, universal social security and welfare assistance have played their role as safety nets,
with the proportion of households receiving SA more than doubling from 6% of the population
in the early 1990s to 13% in 1996. A period of growth has followed in the second half of the
1990s, contributing to an important reduction in unemployment. However, pre-recession levels
have not been restored. The proportion of long-term unemployment, o¢ cially de￿ned as being
out of work for 12 months or more, has declined and stabilized below 25% of total unemployment
in 2001.
As in other countries, understanding the interactions and complementarities between SA and
￿rst tier unemployment bene￿ts is important. Finnish jobseekers with su¢ cient contribution
records are entitled to time-limited unemployment insurance bene￿ts. The system consists of
a basic mandatory scheme paying ￿ at-rate bene￿ts and a voluntary scheme providing earnings-
related top-ups. Both are non-means tested. One important measure taken by the Finnish
government in response to soaring unemployment rates during the early 1990s was the intro-
duction of unemployment assistance in 1994. This program, known as Labour Market Support,
2In Finland, the Ministry of Social A⁄airs and Health (2006) acknowledges the possible role of information
costs and stigma, yet emphasizes the di¢ culties involved in producing reliable estimates using interview-based
data.
3covers jobseekers who are not entitled to insurance bene￿ts (notably the young unemployed) or
have exhausted their entitlements. It is non-contributory, means-tested (except for older un-
employed aged 55 and above) and not time-limited. The maximum amount of unemployment
assistance is similar to the basic allowance under the unemployment insurance scheme, around
23 euro/day in 2002, but is reduced with a means test. Importantly, the resulting entitlements
can be topped up by SA bene￿ts. In fact, the concurrent receipt of unemployment bene￿ts and
SA is common, particularly among the long-term unemployed (see Saarela, 2004).
3.2 Features and Entitlement Rules of the SA Scheme
SA rules described hereafter are decided at the national level but SA is administered locally by
municipalities. We focus in this study on SA payments aimed at supporting recurring living
expenses of low-income families, or ￿ regular￿SA. It is paid on a monthly basis and is generally
means-tested on the income of the previous month. The assessment unit is the nuclear family,
de￿ned as a single individual or a couple plus all children under 18.3 Subject to relevant income
criteria, all private adult persons can apply for SA bene￿ts; military and students (during term
time) are in principle not entitled to it. Local authorities may also exercise some discretion
depending on claimants￿circumstances. This may a⁄ect the evaluation of needs for regular SA,
as extensively discussed below, and also concern the fact that municipalities sometimes grant
non-regular bene￿ts.4
Eligibility and entitlement amounts are computed monthly as the di⁄erence between recog-
nized economic needs and total family means, according to the simple formula:
SA = Max[0;(B + AC + HCsa) ￿ (Y + HB + FB)]: (1)
The maximum entitlement is composed of a basic amount B to cover essential needs, a supple-
mentary bene￿t corresponding to additional costs AC and a bene￿t HCsa covering a certain
part of the family￿ s housing costs. The income assessment accounts for net incomes Y , housing
bene￿ts HB and family bene￿ts FB.
On the income side, Y corresponds to the sum of individual incomes of all family members,
earned income or replacement incomes, net of taxes and mandatory social contributions. Family
3Children over 17, grand parents, other relatives or cohabitants are considered families of their own (possibly
with their own partners and children). We account for the possibility that one physical household consist of more
than one family and, correspondingly, receive more than one SA payment.
4These include one-o⁄ supplements as well as SA for special situations (sickness and other life events) and
preventative SA bene￿ts. These other, non-regular forms of SA, are typically temporary and hence characterized
by short bene￿t durations. They are not (and typically cannot be) explicitly modeled by TUJA. We discuss their
treatment in the next section.
4bene￿ts, FB, include universal child bene￿ts and child maintenance bene￿t but exclude some
minor family-related transfers. Housing bene￿ts HB depend on ￿ accepted￿housing costs, which
correspond to actual costs, HC, up to a maximum level C(Z). This ceiling is a function of a set Z
of household characteristics (age and size of the dwelling, municipality, number of inhabitants).
In multi-family households, total HB is generally allocated to each family in proportion to its
relative size within the household.
The basic amount B designed to cover necessities is a function of family size and composition.
It amounts to 375 or 359 euro ￿depending on the region ￿for a single individual (2003 ￿gures),
70% more for a couple, plus another 70% for a ￿rst child between 10 and 17 years of age or
63% for a ￿rst child under 10; these latter percentages are reduced by 5 points for the second
child and by 10 for each further children. Recognized additional costs, AC, consist of work-
related expenses (e.g. childcare fees), healthcare expenses and possibly other expenses due to
speci￿c circumstances. They are conditional on case-by-case judgments of claimants￿economic
situations. Housing costs recognized for SA calculations, HCsa, are determined by municipalities
on the basis of local rent levels. They are equal to housing costs used for computing housing
bene￿ts, minus a small part of 7% that recipient families are supposed to cover themselves
since 1997, plus part of the di⁄erence between the actual costs HC and the ceiling C when
HC ￿C > 0. The fact that bene￿t agencies can apply some discretion on AC and HCsa levels,
and hence on deciding whether claimants￿circumstances make them eligible for SA support, is
potentially important and carefully investigated in some detail below.
4 Measuring Non-Take-up
4.1 Data, Selection and Implementation
We use the Finnish Income Distribution Survey (IDS), a rotating two-year panel containing
information on incomes, direct taxes, bene￿ts and socio-economic characteristics of individuals
living in private households. We use the eight waves from 1996 (25;328 individuals) to 2003
(29;070 individuals) as weighted representative samples of the population of each year. The
sample size corresponds to around 0:5% of the population, with slight variations across years.
Information on actual SA receipt (annual amount, number of months of receipt) is based on
registers and does not su⁄er from under-reporting. IDS provides a reasonably good match
with o¢ cial municipal statistics, as assessed by T￿rm￿lehto (2001). Most of the necessary
information to assess theoretical eligibility (income, capital, socio-demographic characteristics)
is based on the taxation registers (for all taxable incomes) and other speci￿c registers (e.g., for
non-taxable bene￿ts). This is the same information that bene￿t agencies use when determining
5bene￿t entitlements and is therefore accurate and well-suited for investigating bene￿t take-up.
Some auxiliary information is gathered through interviews conducted by Statistics Finland on
the same households. Some of it, particularly actual housing costs HC and the duration of
individuals￿activity status over the year, is also used to determine eligibility and may introduce
measurement errors as discussed below.
We select the group of working or potentially working families. In particular, students,
disabled and pensioners are excluded from the sample we analyze. Students are in principle
not entitled to SA during school terms but a substantial number of them receive some support
according to IDS data. They may work during the summer, may not declare student status
during the year, or bene￿t from discretionary decisions from municipalities depending on their
circumstances (e.g. when waiting for a student loan). Pensioners and disabled also present some
scope for errors in eligibility assessment since they are more frequently subject to additional
payments from municipalities (AC) to cover medical expenses, health care, etc. In any case,
Finnish pensioners are rarely eligible for regular SA which is the subject of this study (the
minimum pension is typically slightly above SA thresholds) and rarely experience income poverty
(Riihel￿ et al., 2001).
We now describe the practical aspects of measuring theoretical eligibility. To apply formula
(1), we ￿rst need to determine family means. Net incomes Y are taken from registers (gross
incomes, taxes, social contributions) as well as bene￿ts HB and FB. We refrain from simulating
these bene￿ts using TUJA in order to minimize the scope for simulation errors and to avoid the
problem of non-take-up of housing bene￿ts (see J￿ntti, 2006). As in Riphahn (2001), monthly
income information for each family member is constructed by combining the annual values
recorded in the data with information on the number of months spent in di⁄erent labor-market
status over the year (part-time or full-time salary work, receipt of unemployment bene￿t, inac-
tivity).5 Notice that this information is likely a⁄ected by measurement errors since it is drawn
from interviews (and also because we assume that income levels do not change during each labor
market spell). Then we assess total family needs. The basic amount B is a function of family
composition and is accounted for in a straightforward way.6 The main di¢ culty in assessing
5Note that, using this approach, monthly family incomes cannot be reconstructed reliably when more than one
adult changes status during the year, because there is no information in these cases on the overlap of di⁄erent
states between di⁄erent family members. We have therefore dropped such families from the sample, which leads
to a noticeable but relatively minor reduction of the sample size (by less than 5%).
6Note however that our data provides demographic characteristics at the end of each year while demographic
changes (birth, divorce) during the year could lead to incorrect assessments of family needs. Hence we exploit
the panel dimension to identify families whose demographic make-up changes during the year. We ￿nd that such
6needs pertains to uncertainties about accepted housing costs, HCsa, and additional costs, AC.
Both are in￿ uenced by some degree of discretion and judgment by bene￿t o¢ ces. For housing
costs, the ceiling C is fully determined by o¢ cial rules and register information on household
characteristics. However, actual costs, HC, originate from the complementary interview-based
data; comparison with housing bene￿ts received indicates that HC are likely to be understated.
IDS data covers some of the additional costs AC (notably for childcare) but probably not all
those recognized by bene￿t agencies on the basis of individual circumstances ￿although we have
excluded pensioners for whom additional costs are likely to be most important. In section 4.3,
we analyze the sensitivity of our results to varying levels of these costs.
4.2 Baseline Results
Previous calculations identify eligible families while the data informs about actual SA receipt.
The samples obtained on this basis are described in Table 2, for the pooled years 1996 to
2003. A number of observations can be made. Eligible families, claiming or not, are more often
singles and have fewer children than non-eligible families ￿these families belong to the poorest
group (as in other Nordic countries, but contrary to the large majority of OECD countries,
child poverty rates in Finland are lower than average poverty). A majority of families claiming
SA already receive unemployment assistance. Correspondingly, the heads of these families also
experience longer spells of unemployment. Those failing to take up SA are more likely to have
access to resources other than employment and replacement incomes (almost one fourth are
self-employed). Non-take-up families also own their dwelling more frequently. Income levels are
lower in the take-up group. Their monthly average SA entitlements are only slightly higher, but
expected bene￿t duration may be higher ￿see the regression analysis below.
We introduce some notation and de￿ne two alternative measures of non-take-up. Denote E
the number of families eligible for regular SA (as simulated by TUJA), T the number of families
eligible for and receiving SA (the ￿takers￿ ), and M the number of families receiving some SA
but deemed non-eligible for regular SA (￿missed￿eligibility). The total population of recipients
is therefore T + M while a direct measure of the eligible population not claiming regular SA is
E ￿ T. A ￿rst de￿nition of the non-take-up rate (NTU) ignoring M goes as follows:
NTU1 = (E ￿ T)=E:
We have mentioned above that other forms of SA bene￿ts coexist with regular SA. Importantly,
these cannot be identi￿ed in the micro-data because receipts of both regular and irregular SA
changes are rare enough not to a⁄ect results in any signi￿cant way (details available from the authors).
7are recorded in the same variable. Yet, those who are only eligible for non-regular bene￿ts will
be part of M, together with recipients of regular SA for whom we have "missed" the eligibility
due to erroneous assessment of their needs, other simulation errors or, indeed, administrative
error. These types of errors are referred to as Type II or beta errors in what follows. Thus,
in an alternative de￿nition, we reassess the number of eligible families (at the denominator) to
account for non-regular SA or beta errors, that is:
NTU2 = (E ￿ T)=(E + M):
In the numerator, the number of families entitled to, but not claiming, regular SA remains
unchanged (M cancels out as non-regular SA and beta errors are added to both E and T).
Conceptually, these two measures can be seen as lower and upper bounds of the extent of
non-take-up. In our baseline scenario on the whole selected sample and for the year 2003, they
are found to be 51% and 43% respectively (￿rst line of Table 3). Figure 2 describes the time
trend of NTU1, NTU2 and the balance between eligible and recipient families in the selected
sample over the 1996-2003 period. There is a gradual and signi￿cant increase in non-take-up from
44% to around 51% according to NTU1 (from 36% to 43% according to the more conservative
measure NTU2). When considering years with extreme values, namely 1997 and 2002, NTU1
increases from 40% to 53:5% and NTU2 from 31% to 45%. Underlying this upwards trend is a
relatively stable population of eligible families after 1998 combined with a declining numbers of
recipients. We suggest possible explanations for this pattern in the next section.7
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We assess the robustness of our results using alternative simulations of theoretical SA entitle-
ments. One important aspect is how well eligibility simulations match up with SA receipt as
recorded in the data. In particular, M, as a proportion of all recipients, appears to be relatively
large in our baseline (cf., Table 3) and requires further investigation. This "missed" eligibility
includes beta errors a⁄ecting regular SA and recipients of non-regular SA, which is not modeled.
In view of the high quality of the data on SA receipt and income levels, beta errors are likely
due to incomplete or erroneous information about needs (AC + HCsa) or duration of activity
status over the year used to construct monthly incomes.
For the year 2003 (results for other years available from the authors), we ￿rst investigate the
7We have checked that standard errors obtained when assuming asymptotic normality are not too di⁄erent
from those obtained by brute force bootstrapping (randomly drawing 200 samples with replacement from the
original one and each time recalculate non-take-up). We ￿nd similar results (2.7 with bootstrap compared to 2.1
for asymptotic standard errors).
8sensitivity of non-take-up and the prevalence of the beta errors to +5% and +15% variations
in family-speci￿c additional costs AC and recognized housing costs HCsa respectively. These
changes were chosen on the basis of the discussion above, which indicated that these elements of
family needs are likely to be underestimated in the baseline simulations. For completeness, we
also examine a reduction (￿5%) of the two variables in order to test for symmetry around the
baseline. Results are reported in Table 3. Most importantly, it is reassuring that the resulting
non-take-up rates do not vary much. For the sample as a whole and over all scenarios, NTU1
remains in a 50 ￿ 54% range (43 ￿ 45% according to NTU2). Beta errors partly disappear,
suggesting that family needs and in particular AC, are indeed somewhat understated in our
baseline simulations.
Results for single individuals, who make up some 80% of recipients, show a slightly lower
level of non take-up, around 45% (38%) according to NTU1 (NTU2). For this group, the speci￿c
measurement problems related to multi-adult families disappear and the extent of beta errors
is much lower as a result (M is also smaller because families with children are more likely to
receive one-o⁄ payments and other types of non-regular SA due to temporary needs).8 The
third and fourth columns of Table 3 present results on a sub-group of families where all adults
remain in the same employment status during the entire 12-month observation period (this
group represents a large majority of eligible families ￿around 75%). This group is not subject
to potential errors a⁄ecting the construction of monthly information on incomes when status
changes over year. We observe that, in this case, non-take-up rates decrease slightly, by 2 points
for the whole sample and by 4 points for singles, while the proportion of "missed" eligibility
drops to half of the baseline numbers. In the case of singles, this proportion drops to very small
levels, around 2 ￿ 3%, depending on the assumptions concerning AC and HCsa:
This exercise illustrates that errors occur in the simulation of theoretical entitlements despite
high-quality data. Importantly, however, non-take-up rates are relatively stable even for larger
variations of our ￿ needs￿measure. These results con￿rm that non-take-up rates in Finland fall
into the range of previous results for Germany or France, as surveyed in Table 1, but are lower
than those found in earlier studies on Nordic countries.9
8Note that lower levels of non-take-up for singles may also be due to genuine di⁄erences in claiming behavior
and not necessarily to lower rate of simulation errors. Also note that the presence of single parents in the "singles"
group makes that some understatement of family needs still persists and take-up measures for singles also vary
when increasing AC and HCsa.
9For instance, we ￿nd an estimate of 35 ￿ 44% (baseline) for the year 1996, substantially below the 60%
reported by Virjo (2000) using 1995 data. This pattern is consistent with the common presumption noted above
that non-take-up rates tend to be too high when evaluated using interview data.
9Before turning to estimations, we take a look at non-take-up rates for low income groups ￿
the target group of such policy. Figure 3 distinguishes vintiles (1/20) of equivalised disposable
income, zooming in on the ￿rst seven vintiles of the distribution in year 2003, i.e., the income
groups where we observe SA recipients. Not all of these are poor. When identi￿ed by a poverty
line at 50% of the median income, the poor are essentially in the ￿rst vintile (the headcount
ratio is slightly less than 5%). The comparison of eligibility and actual receipt is striking. At
the bottom of the distribution, SA is ￿ theoretically￿well targeted to the poorest. Indeed, more
than 90% of those with incomes below 50% of the median are eligible for regular SA, against
5% of the non-poor. But because of non-take-up, SA support partly fails to reach them in
practice.10 We ￿nd that the recipients in these lowest vintiles are composed mostly of single
individuals, whose SA entitlements are generally not su¢ cient to lift them above the poverty
line. Income groups in higher vintiles (above the poverty line) are mostly made up of families
with children. Recipient families are more likely to escape poverty partly because of relatively
more generous SA amounts (the implicit equivalence scale is more favorable to children than the
￿modi￿ed OECD￿scale used to calculate poverty). As noted above, ￿ missed￿eligibility is also
more frequent for this group. Importantly, and reassuringly for the validity of our exercise, the
error potentially committed is concentrated among higher-income groups while it is very small
in the poorest population.
5 Model Estimation and Decomposing Time Trend
5.1 Modeling and Estimating Non-Take-up
We focus on the eligible group according to our baseline simulation and model non-take-up as a
simple binary decision. This choice can be rationalized using a simple structural interpretation
following Pudney et al. (2002) or Mo¢ tt (1983). Denote B(X) the theoretical entitlement level
function of family characteristics X. The money-metric disutility of claiming the bene￿t can be
written as a positive cost eZ￿+" which depends on a vector Z of household-speci￿c characteristics
and a random term " (optimization error). A family does not claim the bene￿t if the costs more
than o⁄set the gain, i.e. B(X) < eZ￿+", or equivalently if the propensity not to take up:
N￿ = Z￿ ￿ logB(X) + "
is positive. Assuming that " follows a normal distribution of zero mean leads to the standard
probit model. The marginal e⁄ect of logB is a priori unknown and not forced to equal unity
10This overall picture is consistent with the ￿ndings of Aho and Virjo (2002) who show that receipt of SA is
only weakly correlated with income poverty.
10in our estimations.11
To facilitate interpretation, Table 4 reports marginal e⁄ects of the covariates on the prob-
ability of non-take-up. The baseline speci￿cation shows a satisfactory ￿t. Note that some of
the estimates in our speci￿cation may not be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero when using single
year data, due to the small sample size for each independent year. Thus table 4 also reports
results for the pooled waves (last two columns). We distinguish between the complete selection
of eligible families and the sub-group of long-term unemployed. The latter group, de￿ned here
as families with a total of less than two months spent in employment (around 58% of the to-
tal selection of eligible families), constitutes a particularly vulnerable population that deserves
speci￿c attention.
Our ￿ndings are broadly in line with other studies, including Anderson and Meyer (1997),
Riphahn (2001) but also with more qualitative studies like Virjo (1999) and Gustafsson (2002)
for Finland and Sweden. We discuss results along the lines of Riphahn (2001), who emphasizes
three main groups of determinants of take-up behavior: the amount and duration of the expected
bene￿ts, information and transaction costs of applying for social assistance and factors a⁄ecting
individual stigma or its perception. It is con￿rmed that higher amounts of SA entitlements
signi￿cantly reduce the probability of non-take up in most years.12 A range of variables could
act as plausible proxies for a second aspect of entitlement, expected bene￿t duration. This
includes characteristics associated with a more permanent need for income support. Being a
pensioners or disabled are two obvious candidates but we have excluded these groups from our
analysis. Single parents with young children may also depend on SA for longer periods and
being a single parent is indeed associated with a lower non-take-up probability in the pooled
sample. Education variables for the family head can be expected to proxy her long-term earnings
potential (but alternative interpretations are possible). Low education is found to be a fairly
stable determinant of take-up behavior (with only few years exception), associated with lower
non-take-up probabilities. Along the same line of reasoning, the permanent income of SA entitled
self-employed or owners of their own dwelling is more likely to exceed current income than for the
11In general the entitlement level B is only identi￿ed by parametric restriction (log) or possible non-linearity
or discontinuity in the function B(X). Exclusion restrictions may also apply if vector Z does not overlap with
family characteristics X used in the bene￿t computation. See Pudney (2001).
12The elasticity is very small, however. Evaluated by simulation over the whole sample (pooled years), a 10%
increase in SA translates into a reduction of non-take-up probabilities of around 0.5 percentage points (compared
to 2 points in Riphahn, 2001). Also, Figure 4 (top) reports the SA amounts for claimants and non-claimants,
con￿rming the very small di⁄erences found in average amounts (cf. Table 2). Other variables seem to have
more in￿ uence. Overall, the distribution of the predicted propensity not to claim, c N￿, shows marked di⁄erences
between claimants and non-claimants, as can be seen in Figure 4 (bottom).
11SA entitled group on average. Consistent with such a pattern, these two characteristics indeed
turn out to be stable correlates of non-take-up, with signi￿cantly negative marginal e⁄ects for all
years.13 A variable accounting for the actual duration unemployment (number of months during
the year) shows that longer-term unemployed have a substantially higher claiming propensity;
this result holds for most years and for the pooled data. The receipt of unemployment assistance
is also a stable explanatory factor, signi￿cant for all years. It indicates that families who are
already in touch with a bene￿t agency are more likely to make a claim for SA as well (see
Saarela, 2004). For these claimants, the marginal stigma and transaction costs of applying for
SA are likely to be low. The same reasoning applies to those using social housing, who show a
signi￿cantly higher propensity to claim for half of the years and in the pooled sample.
Year dummies measure time ￿xed-e⁄ects in relation to 1996. They con￿rm that the level
of non-take-up has increased since 2000. Estimates for the time trend are however not signi￿-
cant for the long-term unemployed, suggesting that the claiming pattern of this group is more
homogenous and more stable. We have also tested the signi￿cance of regional indicators: coe¢ -
cients are signi￿cant only for two of the years and insigni￿cant in the pooled sample. However,
an alternative speci￿cation with interaction of years and regions passes a LR test at the 8%
signi￿cance level. This is consistent with di⁄erentiated take-up trends across municipalities ￿a
point discussed in the concluding section.14
5.2 Time Trend: A Decomposition Approach
Finally we attempt to explain the notable increase in non-take-up rates over the period of
interest, as illustrated in Figure 2. The total change amounts to 13:5 points, from 40% to
53%, with NTU1. It is possible that claiming behavior has changed during the period under
13Riihel￿ et al. (2001) indicate that in Finland, self-employment is one of the main contributors to poverty
headcounts when measured in income terms, but a small contributor for consumption-based measures. Note also
that among the dichotomous indicators, home ownership (outright) has the largest marginal e⁄ect, increasing the
non take-up probability by 31 points, which is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to Riphahn (2001).
14Other variables have more minor e⁄ects. The presence of children re￿ ects greater needs and possibly a greater
willingness of parents to resort to the welfare system. The e⁄ect is not signi￿cant, however, probably because the
e⁄ect of having children is already partly picked up by the single-parent dummy. Since students and pensioners
are excluded from our sample, the variability in terms of age is restricted. As a result, age is signi￿cant only
in the pooled regression and at the 10% level. The positive sign is nonetheless in line with prior studies (e.g.,
Gustafsson, 2002), which generally report that take-up declines with age, and suggest possible age di⁄erences
in information and transaction costs, as well as cohort di⁄erences in terms of perceived stigma. For half of the
years, urban families have a signi￿cantly higher likelihood of non-take-up; this is relatively counter-intuitive if
one thinks that greater anonymity of urban areas may protect applicants from stigmatization, but alternative
interpretations are possible.
12consideration. Negative stigma e⁄ects associated with claiming welfare bene￿ts may be felt
more acutely when unemployment declines during periods of economic recovery (direct survey
evidence shows that it is a⁄ected by the perceived normality of the behavior and the number
of people experiencing economic hardship, cf. Gustafsson, 2002). The fact that the rate of
welfare recipients follows the changes in unemployment rate is also con￿rmed by macro-levels
analysis (Gustafsson, 1984). Alternatively, the increase in non-take-up could be simply due to
a composition e⁄ect. In particular, we could hypothesize that a decrease in the proportion of
long-term unemployed over the period (see Figure 1), i.e., a group characterized by a higher
propensity to claim, drives the result.
To shed some light on the relative merit of these explanations, we decompose the di⁄erence
in predicted non-take-up rates between 1997 (the lowest rate) and 2002 (the highest) into the
relative contributions of coe¢ cients and characteristics (see Fairlie, 2005). Results presented
in Table 5 show that the change in coe¢ cients explains almost all of the time change (96% in
the baseline, and little variation with alternative speci￿cations), possibly re￿ ecting increasing
stigma of relying on SA during economic upturns. The change in the composition of the eligible
population is marginal. We conjecture that while the proportion of long-term unemployed in
the population as a whole saw a marked decline, this did not carry over to the sub-population of
people entitled to SA (the core poverty group). Hence, the decreasing number of SA recipients
reported in Figure 2 is not a direct consequence of lower unemployment but more likely due to
a change in take-up patterns during the economic recovery in Finland.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have provided some evidence of substantial non take-up of social assistance in Finland using
administrative data and detailed eligibility simulations. Stable factors seem to act in favor of
lower claiming costs (owning one￿ s home, being self-employed) or to encourage take-up (expecting
long-term unemployment and/or high levels of social assistance payments), consistently over the
eight years under study and in line with results for other countries. A simple decomposition
analysis suggests that claiming behavior has changed in post-recession years, leading to a decline
in the number of recipients.
Our study con￿rms that measuring non-take-up is a di¢ cult task, even when using high-
quality register data. Were complete and robust data available on household characteristics,
incomes, bene￿ts and their timing, some important uncertainties would remain when modeling
entitlements. In particular administrative practices are likely to be decisive in determining
the outcomes of entitlement decisions. Further research is necessary, for instance by exploiting
13regional variation in SA payments to study potential di⁄erences in relevant practices between
bene￿t o¢ ces. A longitudinal perspective could also throw light on bene￿t agencies￿behavior
and incentives. For instance, as in other Nordic countries, transfers of responsibilities from
central to local government have taken place in Finland in recent years, possibly accompanied
by more restrictive handling of SA claims.
This raises broader issues related to the appropriate measurement and interpretation of non-
take-up rates. Large rates, as found in the present study, have important implications for the
target e¢ ciency of anti-poverty programs but do not necessarily point to the non-optimality
of the systems in force. A more likely explanation is the acceptance of stigma/transaction
costs by governments as a way to reducing program enrolment (see Kleven and Kopczuk, 2008,
for a modeling of social program complexity as a policy instrument). The recent empirical
literature has precisely focused on the role of administrative hassle as a screening device to
exclude those with higher permanent income (like the self-employed) and to target those with
the most urgent (and long-term) needs for assistance (e.g., Currie, 2004). Our estimates show
that the Finnish system tends to perform relatively well in this respect. Also, future studies will
have to deal with the fact that households￿claiming behavior is not the only factor a⁄ecting
apparent non-take-up. Indeed many OECD countries have recently moved towards a ￿rights
and responsibilities￿approach, which emphasizes the activation of bene￿t recipients allied to
the possibility of bene￿t sanctions for those not complying with job-search and other behavioral
requirements. While sanctions are currently often partial (including in Finland), it is likely
that an increasing number of low-income individuals fail to receive bene￿ts not because they do
not claim them, but because they are denied bene￿ts as a result of behavior which researchers
typically cannot easily observe.
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Real GDP growth rate (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Proportion of long-term unemployment (%)
Poverty headcount ratio (%)
Sources: OECD; Income Distribution Survey; own calculations. Poverty line: 50% of the median of equivalised income
(modified OECD scale). Remark: in the first half of the 90s, poverty headcount ratio decreases as the recession hits
middle/high income as much as the poorest (Riihelä et al., 2001); absolute poverty however increases substantially over the
period. Second half of the 90s: rise of relative poverty explained by a relatively faster recovery for higher income groups.





















































































No of eligible families (selected sample) - TUJA simulations
Number of recipients (selected sample) - IDS data
NTU1 = (E - T) / E
NTU2 = (E - T) / (E + M)
Note: non take up measures (NTU) based on number of eligible families (E), claiming families (T) and number of
missed eligibility (M, which correspond to non-regular SA and beta-error). Dashed lines represent std. err.












1 2 3 4 5 6 7
First seven vintiles (equivalized disposable income)
Frequency of families eligible for regular SA (E)
Frequency of families who take up regular SA (T)
Frequency of `missed' eligibility (M)
NTU1
NTU2
Note: incomes equivalized using modified OECD scale. For definitions of Non-Take-up rates (NTU), see Figure 2
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Figure 4: SA Amounts and Non-Take-Up Propensity
18Table 1: Some Literature on the Non-take-up of Social Assistance
Country Data Years Program* Selection Non-take-up rate
Moffitt (1983) US PSID 1976 AFDC Single mothers 55%










Kim and Mergoupis (1997) US SIPP 1976-88-89 AFDC Working poor 46%
Fry and Stark (1989) UK FES 1984 Supplementary Benefit (SB)* All 13% - 19%
Pudney et al. (2002) UK FRS 1997-2000 Income Support (IS) Pensioners 34% - 35%
Bramley et al. (2000) Scotland SHCS 1996 Income Support (IS) All 30-50%
Terracol (2002) France ECHP 1994-96
Minimum Income (Revenu
Minimum d'Insertion) All 35% - 48%
Neuman and Hertz (1998) Germany 1991
Social Assistance (Hilfe zum
Lebensunterhalt) All 52.3% - 58.7%
Kayser and Frick (2000) Germany GSOEP 1996
Social Assistance (Hilfe zum
Lebensunterhalt) All 62.9%
Riphahn (2001) Germany EVS 1993
Social Assistance (Hilfe zum
Lebensunterhalt) All 62.3%







Gustafsson (2002) Sweden n.a. 1985, 1997 Social Assistance All 70-80%
AFDC stands for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Note: PSID is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, SIPP is the Survey of Income and Program Participation, CPS is the Current Population
Survey, FES is the Family Expenditure Survey, FRS is the Family Resource Survey, SHCS is the Scottish House Condition Survey, ECHP is the
European Community Household Panel, GSOEP is the German socio-economic Panel, EVS is the Income and Expenditure Survey for
Germany.
* Supplementary Benefit (SB) is the ancestor of the Income Support (IS) in the UK.
@ Specific data on Rotterdam and Nijmegen








Single (%) 0.47 0.80 0.78
No. of children 0.67 0.55 0.55
Own home (%) 0.65 0.13 0.51
Living in Helsinki (%) 0.29 0.24 0.26
Household head:
age 40 37 36
farmer or self-employed (%) 0.11 0.03 0.23
primary education (%) 0.22 0.39 0.29
lower secondary education (%) 0.41 0.44 0.47
upper sec. or tertiary education (%) 0.37 0.17 0.25
no. months unemployed during year 1 7 3
family receives unemployment benefit (%) 0.19 0.24 0.22
family receives unemployment assistance (%) 0.13 0.71 0.34
average income before taxes & benefits (euro/year) 30,813 6,908 7,863
average SA amount (observed) (euro/month) 271
average SA amount (simulated) (euro/month) 234 230
no. of obs. (pooled years) 59,123 2,131 4,901
Sources: IDS administrative data and simulations using the microsimulation model TUJA.
20Table 3: Non-Take-up rates: Baseline and Sensitivity Analysis
NTU 1 NTU 2 M/(M+E) NTU 1 NTU 2 M/(M+E)
All family types:
Baseline 0.51 0.43 0.15 0.49 0.42 0.08
Additional Costs (uniform change)
-5% 0.50 0.43 0.16 0.48 0.40 0.08
+5% 0.52 0.44 0.12 0.50 0.42 0.07
+15% 0.54 0.45 0.10 0.52 0.44 0.05
Housing Costs (uniform change)
-5% 0.51 0.43 0.15 0.49 0.41 0.08
+5% 0.52 0.44 0.14 0.50 0.42 0.08
+15% 0.53 0.44 0.12 0.51 0.43 0.07
Singles:
Baseline 0.45 0.38 0.11 0.41 0.35 0.03
Additional Costs (uniform change)
-5% 0.44 0.37 0.12 0.40 0.34 0.03
+5% 0.46 0.39 0.10 0.42 0.36 0.03
+15% 0.46 0.39 0.07 0.43 0.36 0.02
Housing Costs (uniform change)
-5% 0.44 0.37 0.11 0.41 0.34 0.03
+5% 0.46 0.39 0.10 0.42 0.36 0.03
+15% 0.46 0.39 0.08 0.43 0.36 0.03
                NTU1 = (E - T) / E
                NTU 2 = (E - T) / (E + M)
Note: Sensitivity analysis for the year 2003. Non-take-up measures (NTU) based on the number of eligible families (E), of




* Families where adults are observed in the same labor market state (part-time work, full-time work, unemployed, inactive)
during the year.
and M/(M+E): number of "missed" eligibility over total number of recipients (i.e., recipients deemed eligible, T, or not, M).
21Table 4: Probit Estimations of Non-Take-up
Variables
Charact. of the family head:
No or primary education -0.169 *** -0.157 ** -0.272 *** -0.107 -0.209 *** -0.258 *** -0.281 *** -0.181 *** -0.155 ***
Lower secondary education -0.104 * -0.126 * -0.183 *** -0.098 -0.104 -0.213 *** -0.165 ** -0.079 * -0.119 *** -0.130 ***
Single parent with young children -0.036 -0.124 -0.285 *** -0.374 ** 0.032 -0.044 -0.049 0.020 -0.085 ** -0.026
# Children -0.002 0.000 -0.005 0.012 -0.017 -0.032 ** -0.004 0.001 -0.007 -0.013
Age 0.002 0.004 * -0.001 0.003 0.004 * 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 * 0.003
Self-employed 0.296 *** 0.168 * 0.310 *** 0.384 *** 0.318 *** 0.287 *** 0.144 ** 0.269 *** 0.283 *** 0.465 ***
Family characteristics:
Urban 0.042 0.106 * 0.160 *** 0.145 ** 0.024 -0.016 0.128 *** 0.000 0.064 *** 0.057 **
Social rent -0.104 * -0.120 * -0.041 -0.016 -0.181 *** -0.099 ** -0.080 -0.191 *** -0.108 *** -0.113 ***
Dwelling owner (outright) 0.233 *** 0.310 *** 0.374 *** 0.282 *** 0.283 *** 0.332 *** 0.401 *** 0.284 *** 0.311 *** 0.347 ***
Dwelling owner (mortgage) 0.213 *** 0.246 *** 0.242 *** 0.333 *** 0.137 * 0.232 *** 0.275 *** 0.310 *** 0.244 *** 0.272 ***
Family has debts -0.086 * -0.111 0.004 -0.011 -0.077 -0.012 0.204 -0.069 -0.046 -0.036
Unempl. Assistance recipient -0.316 *** -0.243 *** -0.228 *** -0.306 *** -0.202 *** -0.183 *** -0.273 *** -0.206 *** -0.236 *** -0.209 ***
No. of unemployed months -0.027 *** -0.029 *** -0.019 *** -0.009 -0.021 *** -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.016 *** -0.017 *** -0.002
log of SA amount (euro/month) -0.051 ** -0.011 -0.035 * -0.078 *** -0.041 ** -0.026 -0.044 ** -0.052 *** -0.043 *** -0.025 **
Year dummies 1997 -0.007 -0.007
(ref: 1996) 1998 0.069 ** 0.050
1999 0.041 -0.008
2000 0.099 *** 0.062
2001 0.127 *** 0.147 ***
2002 0.110 *** 0.081
2003 0.057 * 0.039
Regional dummies significant at 10% level no no yes no no no no yes no# no
No. observations
Pseudo R2 0.32
The upper table reports marginal effects (i.e., changes in the probability of non-take-up following a marginal change in the explanatory variable) and the level of significance of the
estimates: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
651
0.37 0.37 0.33 0.42













562 547 551 485 4,454 2,580
2002
Table 5: Decomposition of the Time Change in Non-Take-Up
1997 2002 gap Charact. Coeff.
Whole selection (1) 40.0% 53.5% 13.5 4% 96%
(2) - - - -2% 102%
(3) - - - 7% 93%
(4) - - - 3% 97%
Long term unemployed (1) 31.7% 44.5% 12.8 30% 70%
Decomposition Non-take-up rates
Note: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the change in non take-up probability over time; we report the
contribution of the change in characteristics (explained part) vesus change in coefficients; see Fairlie (2005).
Specifications: (1): baseline; (2): with detailed regional dummies; (3): omitting unempl. assistance recipient; (4):
omitting log SA
Sample Specification
22